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FROM FEAR TO RAGE: BLACK RAGE AS A NATURAL PRO-
GRESSION FROM AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Between 1993 and 1995, Americans witnessed a series of no-
table, highly publicized criminal trials.' The most recent notable
trial, that of O.J. Simpson,2 resulted in a not guilty verdict that
proved difficult for some to accept.' The criminal verdict also
was accompanied by a decrease in the level of faith in the crimi-
nal justice system.4 For many, however, doubts about the ability
1. These trials include those of Eric and Lyle Menendez, O.J. Simpson, Susan
Smith, Colin Ferguson, and Lorena Bobbitt. The Menendez brothers, Eric and Lyle,
were found guilty on March 20, 1996, of the shotgun slayings of their parents. See
Ann W. O~eil, Menendezes Are Found Guilty of Killing Parents, L. TIMEs, Mar.
21, 1996, at 1. The brothers' first trial ended in a hung jury after the brothers al-
leged that the killings were precipitated by years of sexual and psychological abuse
suffered at the hand of their father and tolerated by their mother. See id. O.J.
Simpson, a Hall of Fame football player, was acquitted on October 3, 1995, of the
brutal murders of his former wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ronald L. Goldman.
See Jim Newton, Simpson Not Guilty, LA TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1. Susan Smith
was convicted on July 22, 1995, of killing her two sons, aged 3 years and 14
months, by rolling her car into a lake with the boys strapped inside. See Tamara
Jones, Smith Found Guilty of Murdering Sons, WASH. POST, July 23, 1995, at Al.
Colin Ferguson was convicted on February 17, 1995, of multiple homicide and at-
tempted murder after opening fire with an assault rifle on a Long Island commuter
train. See Pat Milton, Gunman Guilty of Murder in Commuter Train Attack, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 1995, at A4. Lorena Bobbitt, on January 21, 1994, was found not
guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of malicious wounding after cutting off her
husband's penis with a kitchen knife. See Marylou Tousignant, Bobbitt Acquitted in
Attack on Husband, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al. Bobbitt alleged that her tem-
porary insanity had been brought about by years of abuse suffered at the hands of
her husband. See id.
2. See Newton, supra note 1, at 1.
3. On October 3, 1995 a jury of 12 men and women acquitted O.J. Simpson on
the charge of murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman. See People v.
Simpson, 1995 WL 704381 at *2-*3. (Cal. Super. Ct. Trans. Oct. 3, 1995). A
telephone poll, sponsored by the Gallup Organization, USA Today, and CNN, con-
ducted from October 19, 1995 to October 22, 1995, showed that 48% of Americans
polled believed that the jury made the wrong decision by reaching a not guilty ver-
dict. Available in Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database.
4. A Newsweek telephone poll conducted between October 4, 1995 and October
6, 1995, revealed that 35% of those polled had less confidence in the country's crimi-
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of the current criminal justice system to punish wrongdoers and
by extension, to protect society at large, likely predated the
Simpson verdict.
From the much publicized Menendez trial, to the much dis-
cussed Bobbitt trial, Americans have questioned judicial accep-
tance of "abuse excuses."5 When evaluating the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, jurors were urged to consider battered
child syndrome in the Menendez trial and battered woman syn-
drome in the Bobbitt trial.' Both battered child syndrome and
battered woman syndrome are commonly asserted abuse excus-
es.7 Although some people may not accept them as valid defens-
es to criminal behavior, defense attorneys expect to use abuse
excuses whenever the opportunity should present itself.8 Few
people, however, anticipated the black rage defense claimed by
Colin Ferguson, the assailant in the Long Island Railroad shoot-
ing,9 and even fewer people were willing to accept the black
rage defense." Some commentators argue that as long as the
excuses are legitimate, they should be allowed." Others, in-
cluding some defense attorneys, warn that accepting an expand-
ing number of abuse excuses as defenses eventually will under-
mine the functioning of our criminal justice system. 2
nal justice system as a result of the Simpson verdict. Available in Westlaw, Public
Opinion Online Database.
5. Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz coined this term in a book by the
same name. See ALAN M. DERsHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER COP-OUTS,
SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994). Professor Dershowitz defines
the "abuse excuse" as "the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a history
of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation." Id. at 3. For a brief overview of abuse
excuses and their application in courts, see id. at 3-42.
6. See id. at 45-47, 57-60.
7. See id. at 45-47.
8. See Eye-to-Eye with Connie Chung (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 1994).
Defense attorney William Kunstler has stated that lawyers must consider the avail-
able defenses and determine which defenses may apply to their client's case. See id.
9. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 89-92 (briefly describing the formulation of
black rage as a defense by defense attorney William Kunstler).
10. A CBS News national telephone poll conducted between May 5, 1994 and
May 7, 1994, found that 85% of those polled did not believe that black rage was an
acceptable defense for having committed a violent crime. Available in Westlaw, Pub-
lic Opinion Online Database.
11. See Eye-to-Eye with Connie Chung, supra note 8.
12. See, DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, passim. Concern for the course of the justice
BLACK RAGE
This Note addresses the link between battered woman syn-
drome, battered child syndrome, and black rage in homicide cas-
es. The first section presents a brief overview of traditional de-
fenses to homicide such as self-defense and insanity and ad-
dresses the admissibility of psychological expert testimony in
general. The second section defines battered woman syndrome,
battered child syndrome, and black rage and analyzes the meth-
od by which courts accept and employ each defense. The third
section argues for admissibility of expert testimony regarding
black rage in order to establish a defendant's insanity. This sec-
tion also asserts that battered woman syndrome and black rage
should receive equivalent treatment. Finally, the fourth section
cautions that although black rage theoretically is viable, in prac-
tical application the consequences of accepting black rage may
prove too enormous for it to become a successful defense.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Traditional Defenses to Homicide
Black rage as a defense to homicide has a foundation in crimi-
nal jurisprudence. To accurately understand and assess black
rage as a defense to homicide, it is necessary to recognize the
nuances of traditional, widely accepted defenses to homicide.
Self-Defense
Self-defense is one of the oldest justifications for homicide in
American jurisprudence.13 Self-defense requires that the use of
deadly force be limited to cases involving protection "against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse
compelled by force or threat."14 A defendant asserting self-de-
fense through use of deadly force must demonstrate a reasonable
system should such excuses continue to be raised and accepted appears to have been
the catalyst for Professor Dershowitz's book. He states: "It is a dangerous trend,
with serious and widespread implications for the safety and liberty of every Ameri-
can." See id. at 3.
13. See generally ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 1119-
27 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing the history and development of the use of deadly force
in self-defense).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962).
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belief in the necessity of the force, a lack of initiation of the al-
tercation on the part of the defendant, and an inability on the
part of the defendant to retreat without the use of deadly
force.' 5 The legal effect of accepting a claim of self-defense in
homicide cases is an acknowledgement that the accused caused
the decedent's death but that such action was justified given the
circumstances and therefore, no crime was committed. 6 When
the self-defense theory prevails, the accused is neither convicted
nor punished.
"Imperfect" Self-Defense
Imperfect self-defense invokes a slightly more subjective view
of traditional self-defense theory. Imperfect self-defense involves
a failure to satisfy one of the elements of traditional self-de-
fense.' Usually, imperfect self-defense entails using force
against another with an honest but unreasonable belief that
such force is necessary." In homicide cases, this element means
that given the circumstances the defendant faced, deadly force
was not necessary. 9 Raising a defense of imperfect self-defense
can yield one of two results depending on the jurisdiction. In
some jurisdictions, if the use of force is not justified, the defen-
dant is guilty of homicide.' ° Thus, imperfect self-defense is not
a justification for homicide in these jurisdictions. Other jurisdic-
tions reduce the charge of homicide to manslaughter, however,
thereby using imperfect self-defense as a mitigating factor rath-
er than a complete excuse."
15. See id. § 3.04(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The requirements for the use of force in self-defense
differ in each state and are not always identical to the Model Penal Code. The re-
quirements, however, are similar in many jurisdictions. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 13, at 1143-44.
16. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7, at 454-55
(2d ed. 1986).
17. See Steffani J. Saitow, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: Does the "Reason-
able Battered Woman" Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 329,
359 (1993).
18. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 5.7, at 463.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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Insanity
The insanity defense differs from traditional self-defense in
one major respect. Self-defense acknowledges that the crime oc-
curred, i.e., the defendant committed the act, but further ac-
knowledges that in some way the defendant's behavior was ex-
cused because his actions were justified.' A successful insanity
plea acknowledges that the criminal act occurred, but the insani-
ty defense holds that the accused is not criminally responsible
due to his mental state.' There are several different legal tests
to determine when and whether the insanity defense should ap-
ply including the M'Naghten rule,' the "irresistible impulse"
test," the Durham "product" test," and the American Law In-
stitute (ALI) "substantial capacity" test." The ALI test is most
commonly employed to determine insanity.'
In most states, an insanity plea, if accepted, manifests itself
22. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
23. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, § 4.1, at 304-06.
24. The M'Naghten rule is the product of an English case by the same name.
See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Under this rule, to prove legal insan-
ity one must show that the accused suffered from a disease of the mind at the time
of the crime and did not know the nature and quality of the act; or if he did know,
that he did not know the act was wrong. See INGO KEILITZ & JUNIUS P. FULTON,
THE INSANrmY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 6 (1984).
25. The "irresistible impulse" test was developed in an attempt to "improve upon
the M'Naghten rule and broaden the standard of insanity " in order to cover those
who might recognize the content and wrongness of an act, but nevertheless be un-
able to control the conduct. See KEILITE & FULTON, supra note 24, at 6-7 (discussing
the evolution of the 'irresistible impulse" test), M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (1843). Thus, the standard for proving insanity under the "irresistible impulse"
test is whether the accused had a mental disease that kept him from controlling his
conduct. See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 24, at 6.
26. The Durham "product" test resulted from Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Dissatisfied with the M'Naghten rule, the court in Durham
announced that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of a mental disease or defect." Id. at 874-75; see also KEILrIz & FULTON, su-
pra note 24, at 7 (discussing the historical background of the Durham test).
27. In order to be classified as legally insane under the "substantial capacity"
test one must lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrong-
fulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962); see also KEILIM & FULTON, supra note 24, at
7-8 (discussing the repudiation of the "product test" and the history of the ALI stan-
dard).
28. See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 24, at 15-16 (classifying jurisdictions and
the insanity tests that they employ in chart form).
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in one of two verdicts. 9 One verdict is "not guilty by reason of
insanity" (NGRI). A NGRI finding indicates that the defen-
dant committed the act but was insane at the time that the
crime was committed.3 No reasonable doubt exists that the
defendant committed the act charged. 2 NGRI assumes that the
defendant would have been found guilty had the defendant been
sane.3 With a NGRI verdict, the court may continually monitor
the defendant by criminal commitment until the defendant is no
longer dangerous and in need of treatment.' The other verdict
involved in insanity pleas is "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI)."5
GBMI was enacted in large part to assuage the fears of the pub-
lic concerning crimes committed by NGRI acquittees after their
criminal commitment terminated. 6 A GBMI verdict finds that
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged but in need of treat-
ment due to psychological illness." Under a finding of GBMI, a
defendant is convicted and sentenced like any other sane, guilty
defendant, sent to a state mental health facility and, theoreti-
cally, treated.38 The defendant remains in the facility until he
has recovered, at which time the defendant serves the remainder
of his sentence in prison or on probation, depending on the con-
ditions of his sentence.3 9
Although many aspects of insanity are governed by changing
statutory law and public perceptions and concerns,40 the legal
process continues to depend on expert psychological evaluation
and testimony for guidance in complex homicide cases.4
29. See id. at 20-22.
30. Id. at 20.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 20-21.
35. Id. at 21.
36. See George L. Blau & Richard A. Pasewark, Statutory Changes and the In-
sanity Defense: Seeking the Perfect Insane Person, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 87
(1994).
37. See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 24, at 21-22.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See generally Blau & Pasewark, supra note 36, passim (analyzing the histor-
ical statutory changes of the insanity defense and the role of public perception in
facilitating those changes).
41. See Former Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Jus-
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Admissibility of Psychological Expert Testimony
Battered woman syndrome, battered child syndrome, and
black rage all are defenses for which expert testimony is essen-
tial to facilitate an understanding of the nature of the defense.
Therefore, the way in which courts historically have treated psy-
chological expert testimony is crucial to analyzing the abuse ex-
cuse defenses. The following overview of admissibility of expert
testimony allows for more informed speculation as to the courts'
treatment of expert testimony regarding the black rage defense.
Expert Testimony
Expert witnesses assist the trier of fact by providing opinions
and testimony within the witnesses' areas of expertise.42 When
presenting expert testimony regarding issues of present scientif-
ic or clinical knowledge, the expert must have "a degree in a
medical or scientific discipline; and... relevant clinical or re-
search experience, and a demonstrated familiarity with current
scientific or clinical information on the specific issue about
which the witness is called to testify."43 Expert testimony is
limited in that experts may not express an opinion on any
question "requiring a conclusion of law or a moral or social value
judgment properly reserved to the court or the jury."' Thus, al-
though allowed in the legal arena, psychological experts are not
expected or permitted to comment on legal matters in criminal
trials.
Most crimes, particularly the crime of murder, focus on the
mens rea of the accused.45 Likewise, defenses such as self-de-
tice, AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Introduction to ABA CRuMiNAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS xviii (1989).
42. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA CRIMIMAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDAtDS, Standard 7-3.11 (1989) [hereinafter ABA].
43. Id. Standard 7-3.13(a)(i-ii).
44. Id. Standard 7-3.9(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 704(b):
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or con-
dition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or infer-
ence as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state
or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense
thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
45. See LAFAVE & SCOT, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing the basic premises of
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fense and insanity also focus on the state of mind of the defen-
dant.46 Historically, mental health experts have been allowed to
testify when a defendant's competency to stand trial was
questioned or when the defendant put forth an insanity plea.'
With the advent of battered woman syndrome, battered child
syndrome, black rage, and other abuse excuses, psychological
expert testimony has changed in terms of admissibility, scope,
and application to situations other than competency and insani-
ty 4
8
MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
Expanding Self-Defense?
Battered Woman Syndrome49
Battered woman syndrome is a concept developed in the late
1970s and a term coined by Dr. Lenore Walker in 1979.5" The
syndrome was developed in order to help explain the psychologi-
cal characteristics manifested by women who were physically
abused by their husbands or lovers and the long-term effects
that resulted as a consequence of the abuse.5
Dr. Walker has defined the battering relationship in three
phases.52 The first phase is considered the "tension-building
phase," in which relatively minor, periodic episodes of psycholog-
ical, physical, or sexual abuse occur.5" The second phase is la-
criminal law).
46. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
47. See generally ABA, supra note 42, Standard 7-1.1 (detailing the various situ-
ations in which psychiatric expert testimony applies).
48. See Diana J. Ensign, Note, Links Between the Battered Woman Syndrome
and the Battered Child Syndrome: An Argument for Consistent Standards in the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Family Abuse Cases, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1619,
1619-21 (1990) (discussing new uses of expert testimony outside of its traditional
uses).
49. Battered woman syndrome is sometimes called "battered wives syndrome."
This Note will use the term "battered woman syndrome," because not all battered
women are married to the men who batter them.
50. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
51. See generally id. (providing a comprehensive study of battered women and
their lives).
52. See id. at 56-70.
53. See id. at 56-59, 107-08.
beled the "acute battering phase," in which extreme violence oc-
curs.' The third phase is defined as the "loving phase."55 It is
termed the loving phase because it is during this phase that the
batterer apologizes to the woman, appears truly remorseful,
promises to change, and the two individuals appear to enter a
"honeymoon" phase filled with the love and compassion typically
associated with the beginning of a new romantic relationship."
When the honeymoon is over, the cycle begins to repeat itself.
5 7
After the cycle occurs twice, and the woman remains in the situ-
ation, the woman is considered a battered woman.58
As time progresses, the battering episodes often increase in
both severity and frequency.59 Yet, the woman remains in the
relationship. 0 The woman remains in the battering relation-
ship in part because she hopes that the "honeymoon" phase will
last forever, 1 and in part because she has been forced into a
state of "learned helplessness."62 Submissiveness and passivity
are often associated with learned helplessness.63 At some point,
which varies depending on the battered woman, the woman feels
that she has no option but to stay with her batterer and remain
the victim of ongoing abuse.' 4 Eventually, however, a battered
woman may endure so much frustration, despair, and isolation
that her perceptions of violence are altered.65 The woman may
violently strike back against the batterer in an effort to free
herself from the cycle of abuse that she may believe ultimately
54. See id. at 59-65.
55. See id. at 65-70; Ensign, supra note 48, at 1623-24.
56. See WALKER, supra note 50, at 65-70; Ensign, supra note 48, at 1624.
57. See WALKER, supra note 50, at 69.
58. See id. at xv.
59. See Ensign, supra note 48, at 1623-24 (describing the cyclical nature of bat-
tered woman syndrome and the way in which the cycles recur and intensify).
60. See WALKER, supra note 50, at xv.
61. See id. at 69.
62. See id. at 42-54. Learned helplessness is a theory originated by experimental
psychologist Martin Seligman. At a most basic level, learned helplessness incorpo-
rates a lack of belief in the ability to control what happens to oneself and, therefore,
one does not believe that she can influence her life and thus does not try to change
it. See i&
63. See id. at 47.
64. See id. at 42-54 (discussing how battering behavior is maintained by the
victim's belief that she has no control over her life).
65. See id. at 52 (discussing the possible consequences of learned helplessness).
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will lead to her death.66 Her striking back often takes the form
of homicide.67
If a woman killed her batterer during an attack, it would be a
clear case of traditional self-defense." When a battered woman
decides to strike back at her batterer, however, it often occurs in
a nonconfrontational situation. 9 That is, the woman is not inimmediate danger or in the midst of an attack.0 It is when a
woman commits a nonconfrontational killing and asserts a theo-
ry of self-defense that her attorneys seek to introduce expert
testimony concerning battered woman syndrome."'
Battered woman syndrome is used to explain why the defen-
dant reasonably believed that she was in a situation requiring
deadly force and to explain why retreating was never an op-
tion. 2 It is a subjective approach to traditional self-defense be-
cause the focus is not on what a reasonable person in the situa-
tion would have felt or how he would have reacted. Rather, the
focus is on how a typical battered woman would perceive the
situation and react to it.
73
Because battered woman syndrome required both a new, non-
traditional approach to self-defense and the use of psychological
expert testimony, courts initially were reluctant to admit expert
testimony on the matter.74 The current trend in most states,
66. See id. at 69-70.
67. See id.
68. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
traditional self-defense). When a woman is being physically battered and reasonably
believes that deadly force is necessary to save her life, the elements of traditional
self-defense would be satisfied. See WALKER, supra note 50, at 69-70.
69. See Saitow, supra note 17, at 357-58 (describing situations in which a wom-
an may kill her abuser during a time of relative peace in the relationship).
70. See id. (describing killings occurring when a batterer is "off guard-sleeping,
intoxicated, or simply in a passive mood").
71. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal
Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 49 (1987) (describing the circumstances under which bat-
tered woman syndrome is raised in homicide cases).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 49-51 (providing a brief overview of early treatment of battered
woman syndrome by the courts). For an example of a court refusing to allow expert
testimony regarding battered women syndrome, see Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455
A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983) (affirming a lower court's decision to exclude such evi-
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however, is to admit battered woman syndrome expert testimo-
ny.7 Admission of expert testimony, however, does not guaran-
tee acceptance of battered woman syndrome as a legitimate ex-
cuse for the behavior of a woman who kills her batterer.7" In
the instances when battered woman syndrome is used by the
defendant and the jury accepts the syndrome, the syndrome may
operate under the imperfect self-defense doctrine.77 Women,
therefore, may be convicted of manslaughter, not murder.7" Al-
lowing a manslaughter conviction rather than a murder convic-
tion serves two purposes. First, a conviction on a reduced charge
allows society to atone for creating and perpetuating an environ-
ment in which a woman can be brutalized routinely by her part-
ner with no chance of protection. Second, a finding of man-
slaughter rather than "not guilty" discourages
dence under the Frye standard on the basis that the defendant had "failed to estab-
lish a methodology used in the expert's study of 'battered women'"); see also State v.
Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981)
Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome"... is inadmissi-
ble herein because (1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of
whether defendant acted in self defense . . . (2) the subject of the expert
testimony is within the understanding of the jury, (3) the "battered wife
syndrome" is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accept-
ed scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the guise of exper-
tise; and (4) its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
Id. at 140. For an explanation and analysis of the Frye standard of admissibility see
infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
75. See Ensign, supra note 48, at 1619-21 (discussing the current trends of ad-
missibility of battered woman syndrome). For examples of cases admitting expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome, see People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); State v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1985); and Fielder
v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
76. Admittance allows experts to testify on the subject. See Ensign, supra note
48, at 1629-30. Admitting expert testimony does not ensure the fact finder's accep-
tance, which involves believing the validity of the theory behind battered woman
syndrome, believing the accused suffered from battered woman syndrome, believing
she had no alternative, and finding in her favor.
77. See Saitow, supra note 17, at 358-59; cf LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 16, §
7.11, at 666 (noting that an imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction may be
appropriate when the jury "could find there was an actual but unreasonable belief'
on the part of the defendant); see also supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (discuss-
ing imperfect self-defense).
78. See supra notes 17-21 (discussing the legal implications of accepting imper-
fect self-defense).
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nonconfrontational killings totally excusing the behavior. 9
Imperfect self-defense is both a reasonable and just outcome
to a situation in which the line between victim and villain be-
comes blurred. Women, however, are not the only people to suf-
fer continual, severe abuse at the hands of someone who profess-
es to love them.0 Children compose a group of individuals who
suffer incredible abuse at the hands of their parents."' In an ef-
fort to understand why children may eventually strike back and
kill their parents without warning, the situation of battered chil-
dren has been compared to that of battered women." The re-sulting theory is labeled "battered child syndrome."'
Battered Child Syndrome'
The term battered child syndrome originally was coined by
Dr. Henry Kempe in 1962 for purposes of describing serious yet
unexplainable injuries observed in children.85 Historically, ex-
pert testimony concerning battered child syndrome was used
against the parents of the victim in child abuse and child homi-
cide cases to prove that the injuries were part of a pattern of
abuse and therefore intentional rather than accidental." The
79. See Saitow, supra note 17, at 359.
80. See Ensign, supra note 48, at 1619 (listing various parties to abuse within
the traditional family structure).
81. See id. at 1625 (discussing a 1987 study that revealed "more than three chil-
dren died each day from abuse and neglect") (citing Summers, The Hedda Conun-
drum, Ms., Apr. 1989, at 54).
82. See Jamie Heather Sacks, A New Age of Understanding: Allowing Self-De-
fense Claims for Battered Children Who Kill Their Abusers, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & PoLY 349, 351 (1994) (analyzing the way in which "[the psychological effects
upon battered children mirror those of battered women" and how "self-defense claims
in parricide cases are essentially identical to those asserted when battered women
kill their abusers").
83. See Ensign, supra note 48, at 1626 (noting several syndromes that have aris-
en to explain child abuse situations).
84. This syndrome often is called "abused child syndrome." For purposes of this
Note, the term "battered child syndrome" covers children who are physically and/or
sexually abused by their parent(s) or guardian(s).
85. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17
(1962).
86. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68-69 (1991) (allowing expert testimony
regarding prior injuries sustained by the child to prove battered child syndrome). In
Estelle, the defendant was convicted of murdering his infant daughter. See id. at 62.
1862
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term battered child syndrome has since taken on new mean-
ing.87
Generally, when currently mentioned, battered child syn-
drome refers to the psychological effects of child abuse on the
child's "emotions, perceptions, and behavior."' There is neither
a set definition nor are there clear phases, as in battered woman
syndrome, largely because "although there is a huge body of re-
search on the psychological characteristics of children who are
abused, that information has not been processed and articulated
in the form of a psychological syndrome."89 There are, however,
great similarities between abused children and abused women.
Child abuse, like spousal abuse, is cyclical. Battered chil-
dren, like battered women eventually suffer frequent and severe
abuse. 1 In child abuse cases, the abuse often occurs without
warning.92 Unlike spousal abuse, the child abuser often will not
offer an apology, in large part because many parents believe
that they have a right to discipline their children physically."
The hesitance of society to interfere in parents' rights to disci-
pline their children, coupled with the fact that an abusive family
tends to isolate itself from anyone who may notice the abuse and
facilitate its termination," leaves the abused child to suffer in
silence. The battered child lives in a state of constant fear of the
next beating or sexual assault.95 Thus, the battered child never
feels safe.96 The battered child, like the battered woman, enters
87. See Sacks, supra note 82, at 354 (describing how the psychological aspects of
battered child syndrome, in addition to the physical aspects, are now studied).
88. Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate
Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense
and the Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 192 (1994).
89. Id. (citing Steven R. flicks, Note, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the
Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 140 (1987)).
90. See id. at 192 n.27.
91. See Sacks, supra note 82, at 354.
92. See id.
93. See PAUL MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS: ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR
PARENTS 13 (1991) (describing the rights and liberties that parents who abuse their
children believe they possess by virtue of being able to reproduce).
94. See Sacks, supra note 82, at 355.
95. This state has been described as "hypervigilance," in which an abused child
has a heightened sense of danger and monitors changes in the parent's behavior in
anticipation of another assault. See id. at 356 (explaining this phenomenon more
fully).
96. Cf id. (describing abused children as developing a "concentration camp" men-
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a stage of learned helplessness. 97
When parricide occurs, the child defendant may seek to intro-
duce expert testimony in the same manner as a woman who
kills her batterer." The child asserts an affirmative defense of
self-defense rather than an insanity argument, because at the
time of commission of the crime, the child often knows exactly
what she is doing.99 Usually, the child may even know that
what she is doing is wrong, and that there are legal consequenc-
es to such actions.'00 Thus, depending on the standard em-
ployed, proving an insanity claim may be prohibitively diffi-
cult.'0 '
The admissibility of expert testimony concerning battered
child syndrome historically has encountered much resis-
tance.1 °2 The resistance is due not only to the fact that bat-
tered child syndrome is a new area with no official recognition
as a psychological syndrome, but also because those jurisdictions
that do not accept battered woman syndrome, with all of its
psychological evidence, likely will reject battered child syndrome
for the same reason.'0 ' Furthermore, those jurisdictions that
accept battered woman syndrome may hesitate to further ex-
pand nontraditional excuses. Recently, however, Washington
accorded battered child syndrome the same status as battered
woman syndrome." 4 There is reason to believe that more
tality).
97. See id. at 355-56; see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing
learned helplessness and its importance in cases of battering).
98. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text. The defendant in a parricide
case uses battered child syndrome to try to explain how hypervigilance allowed the
child reasonably to perceive that the threat of serious bodily harm was imminent.
See Goldman, supra note 88, at 190.
99. See Goldman, supra note 88, at 221-23 (discussing why parricide cases often
involve a claim of self-defense rather than a claim of insanity).
100. See id. at 220-21.
101. See id. at 219-21 (providing an overview of the difficulties of proving legal
insanity in battered child syndrome cases depending on the various standards avail-
able); see also supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text (discussing the current state
of available insanity defenses).
102. See, e.g., State v. Crabtree, 805 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1991) (refusing to adopt a de-
fense centered on battered child syndrome); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo.
1984) (excluding expert testimony of battered child syndrome).
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. See State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). The court held that
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states will follow.'0 5
Admissibility of expert testimony aside, acquittals and hung
juries are consistently less likely in cases of battered child syn-
drome than in cases involving battered woman syndrome.'
The child often is convicted of murder, or, less frequently, of
manslaughter.' 7 Imperfect self-defense again appears to be the
ideal compromise.' 8
Battered child syndrome and battered woman syndrome are
syndromes in which there are identifiable attackers as well as
victims. The ability to portray the now-deceased person as an
unlikable, vicious character undoubtedly renders these two syn-
dromes more palatable to jurors. This factor is not present in
cases involving black rage. Thus, black rage provides a new an-
gle on nontraditional defenses and creates more of a problem in
its acceptance.
Expanding Insanity?
Black Rage
The black rage defense is somewhat of a misnomer because
black rage is not asserted as an affirmative defense in its own
right. Rather, black rage is one of the many characteristics as-
serted to help prove insanity.0 9 It is correct to say that in the
battered child syndrome is "the functional and legal equivalent of the battered wom-
an syndrome." Id. at 503.
105. See e.g., State v. Gachot, 609 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (indicating evi-
dence of mental abuse would be admissible upon a plea of not guilty); Common-
wealth v. Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating evidence of battered
person syndrome was admissible to explain the defendant's action).
106. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 40, 42 (cit-
ing attorney Paul Mones who says that there has been more than a 95% conviction
rate in the cases in which he has represented parricide defendants). The hung jury
result in the first Menendez trial thus should be viewed as an aberration rather
than the norm.
107. See MONES, supra note 93, at 315.
108. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of an
imperfect self-defense). In the case of parricide, imperfect self-defense would allow
one to address the evil of parricide in light of the evil of child abuse. Similarly,
with battered woman syndrome, the doctrine allows for addressing a woman's violent
response in light of the cyclical pattern of abuse to which she has been subjected.
109. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing the various ways
by which to prove insanity).
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current discourse concerning black rage, black rage often is de-
fined as a claim by the defendant that white racism drove him
to insanity." ° This is a very simplistic view of black rage that
barely begins to explain its many nuances.
Although black rage has been thrust into the limelight as a
"new" abuse excuse,"' the doctrine, in fact, has arisen in the
past."' The term "black rage" originates from a book of the
same name by two psychiatrists, Dr. William H. Grier and Dr.
Price Cobbs, published in 1968, which chronicled and analyzed
110. See James Lileks, Hate America? Just Call Kunstler, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Mar. 27, 1994, at 6C, available in 1994 WL 7203296 (stating that the premise
of a black rage defense is that the defendant "was driven insane by centuries of ra-
cial prejudice").
111. Much of the most recent attention given to black rage was generated by the
Colin Ferguson case. On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson opened fire on commu-
ters on the Long Island Railroad. See Sylvia Adcock, 'Black Rage" Strategy: New
Insanity Defense in LIRR Massacre, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1994, at 7, available in 1994
WL 7405334. Allegedly, Colin Ferguson was aiming to shoot white commuters be-
cause of the racism he suffered as a result of his status as a black man in America.
See id. Ferguson succeeded in killing six commuters and wounding nineteen others
that evening. See id.
News of the killings spread across the country rapidly as people tried to under-
stand such a horrific incident. The burning question of why Ferguson acted in this
violent manner was soon answered by William Kunstler. Acting as Colin Ferguson's
defense counsel, Kunstler announced that he would prove that at the time of the
shooting spree, Colin Ferguson was insane and that he had been driven insane by
black rage. See id. The media picked up on the use of this defense and black rage
became a new hot topic of discussion. See Michael Alexander, Ferguson Team Balks
at Gag: Says DA Trying To Bar His Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 1994, at 7,
available in 1994 WL 7401675 (stating that "the incident was reported as far away
as China and has been the subject of major newspaper articles and national televi-
sion shows").
After a flurry of initial publicity, black rage was not proffered as a defense, but
nonetheless the public was confused and incensed. See Judd F. Sneirson, Black Rage
and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 2251, 2252 n.5 (1995). Ferguson decided to represent himself and assert a sim-
ple claim of not guilty, arguing that someone else had committed the shooting. See
id. Needless to say, Ferguson's defense did not succeed. See id. The question re-
mains, however, of whether Kunstler's black rage theory of insanity would have suc-
ceeded had it been employed in the Ferguson case.
112. See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, 'Black Rage' Rises Again As Defense, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 25, 1994, at A6 (discussing a 19th century case in which the court found that
a deceased, black defendant had been insane at the time he committed murder and
that the killings had been precipitated by the abuse that he had suffered on account
of his race).
the psychological state of blacks in America."' One of the
many observations contained in the book is that over the course
of the history of blacks in America, from the institutionalization
of slavery to the maintenance of segregationist Jim Crow laws,
blacks have developed a cultural paranoia regarding whites."
This paranoia leads to an increased suspicion of the actions and
motivations of whites towards blacks." 5 Thus, according to the
theory, blacks constantly are skeptical and fearful of whites,
never letting their guard down."'
The book explained how and why a black person's survival in
America depends on the development of a "healthy" cultural
paranoia."' For some blacks, however, it is not possible to con-
tain the healthy paranoia and the paranoia becomes un-
healthy."5 Such sufferers of paranoia see nonexistent dangers
everywhere."' When blacks kill whites who they perceive as a
threat because of their paranoia, the black rage defense
applies.
120
Expert testimony concerning black rage is a fairly new issue
although the theory underlying black rage previously has been
argued and accepted.' In the late 140s, after a series of
hearings, a trial, and an appeal, the appellate court of the state
of New York found that a black defendant was insane at the
time he killed a white family as the family sat down to din-
ner.122 The court based its reasoning on its belief that the mur-
ders resulted from the defendant's reaction to having been a
113. See WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968).
114. See id. at 161.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. (stating that a black man "must maintain a high degree of suspicion
toward the motives of every white man [and woman] and at the same time never
allow this suspicion to impair his grasp of reality. It is a demanding requirement
and not everyone can manage it with grace").
119. See infra note 132 (detailing the symptoms and manifestations of paranoia).
120. Certain external stimuli, which often take the form of a racial insult, releas-
es an "uncontrollable amount of rage," resulting in physical assault and sometimes
murder. See Goldberg, supra note 106, at 43.
121. See Sherman, supra note 112, at A6 (discussing the relationship of a 19th
century case to the Ferguson case).
122. See id.
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"brutalized Negro."1" The court did not specifically articulate
the defendant's reaction to the brutality that he suffered as be-
ing "black rage," but the court's decision was the functional
equivalent of modern claims of black rage."
Because black rage is involved in homicide cases, state trial
courts logically would be the primary recipients of demands for
admissibility of expert testimony concerning black rage. No per
se rule of exclusion of black rage testimony exists, as of yet, but
courts currently possess the discretion to exclude expert testimo-
ny under both the Frye' and the Daubert.25 standards for
admissibility of expert testimony. In jurisdictions using the Frye
standard, a defendant asserting black rage would need to show
that black rage was generally accepted in the psychological com-
munity before expert testimony would be admissible. Applying
the Daubert standard in federal- courts, or in jurisdictions that
have rules patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the ad-
missibility of expert testimony regarding black rage would de-
pend upon whether such testimony would aid the jury and on
the validity of the underlying scientific reasoning or methodolo-
gy. As evidence of black-specific psychological conditions comes
to light and gains acceptance, however, courts may have no
choice but to accept such testimony under both standards. 2
Currently, there is increasing understanding and acceptance
within the psychological community of the psychology of blacks
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Frye v. United States., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring
general acceptance of the scientific principle in question before finding the expert
evidence to be admissible).
126. See Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (finding that
the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye's requirement of "general accep-
tance" as a precondition for admissibility). The Court in Daubert found that admissi-
bility under the Federal Rules of Evidence depended upon the ability of the evidence
in question to assist the trier of fact provided that the "reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid." Id. at 592-93. Unlike the Frye stan-
dard, "general acceptance" under Daubert is merely one factor in assessing the va-
lidity of the scientific reasoning/methodology. See id. at 594.
127. The eventual admission of black rage testimony will hinge on two factors: (1)
the emergence of experts on the psychology of blacks and (2) those psychologists'
ability to promote the theory of black rage within the scientific community so that
the Daubert standard is satisfied.
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and the ways in which mental illness may be triggered in, and
affect, blacks in different ways than the rest of society.' The
admissibility of black rage testimony to help explain criminal
behavior, therefore, is likely to continue to be an issue facing the
courts.
ADM1TIING EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING BLACK RAGE
Black rage testimony should be allowed into evidence to help
prove insanity when the black rage sufferer asserts the defense
of insanity. Black rage itself, however, should not be considered
a form of insanity. Strictly applying insanity tests to black rage
is inappropriate and may be detrimental to the defendant in
such cases.
Black Rage as Insanity
Black rage is not a separate form of mental illness recognized
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders.129 Therefore, black rage would not satisfy any of the legal
tests of insanity.' To successfully evaluate black rage testimo-
ny, black rage should be viewed as a contributing factor to a
specific mental condition13 rather than as an independent
128. See generally ROBERT T. CARTER, THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND RACIAL IDEN-
TITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (1995) (analyzing race in the mental health field and advo-
cating a more diverse study of the human psyche).
129. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANU-
AL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVI.
130. To satisfy the various legal tests of insanity, evidence of mental disease or
defect is necessary. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. The DSM-1V is
"the resource on which courts and psychiatrists heavily rely in determining legal
insanity." Sneirson, supra note 111, at 2265. Because black rage is not included in
the DSMIV, it is difficult to prove that it is a mental disease. See id& Additionally,
the selection of white targets in black rage killings initially may seem like an act of
racism rather than insanity. See iMleks, supra note 110, at 6C (expressing deep
skepticism as to Colin Ferguson's insanity based upon the methodical manner in
which he selected, then executed his victims).
131. A number of psychiatric diagnoses may negate the responsibility of the de-
fendant. See MARTIN G. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW §
7.4 (3d ed. 1992). These include: (1) psychosis-a state of severe mental and emo-
tional disorganization in which delusions and hallucinations distort reality, see id. at
453-59; (2) hysterical dissociation-disengagement of the human impulse control
mechanism, often resulting in an inability to conform to social norms, see id& at 465-
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form of insanity. Therefore, black rage should be linked to a
legally cognizable form of insanity to be admissible. The well-
established categories of psychosis and paranoia appear to pro-
vide the best link to black rage.'32 If black rage may be charac-
terized neutrally as a psychosis or paranoia, some may argue
that evidence regarding the causes and effects of black rage is
not necessary to prove insanity3 3 and may unduly affect the
jury and its decision.13 The experience of being black, howev-
er, is important not only to establish legal insanity, 35 but is
also an essential factor in psychiatric evaluations of black defen-
dants.136 Thus, to allow psychiatrists to make a diagnosis of
psychosis or paranoia in court without mentioning the "Black
Norm" and/or black rage would not give the trier of fact all of
the relevant evidence about the defendant and the case.
Assuming, however, that courts do not believe that evidence of
black rage is necessary to prove insanity,17 the courts should
78; (3) paranoia--characterized by chronic suspicion and perception of hostility where
none exists nor is intended, often manifested by exaggerated efforts to stave off such
imaginary threats, see id. at 478-82; (4) obsessive-compulsive disorders-inabilities to
resist specific patterns of behavior (prime examples include kleptomania and pyroma-
nia), see id. at 482-86.
132. The disorder can be analogized to a specific form of paranoid psychosis gen-
erally directed at whites, involving extreme, irrational fears of this group based upon
an inability to perceive reality correctly. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying
text (explaining the relationship between black rage and paranoia).
133. See Joel Dreyfuss, Beyond the 5:33: 'Rage" Defense Plays into White Hands,
NEwSDAY, Mar. 31, 1994, at A54 (stating that "[the 'black rage' defense turns a
case of simple insanity into a racial issue").
134. The decision to include evidence of black rage in a trial could be seen as an
attempt to play on the guilt of white jurors and invoke the sympathies of black and
other minority jurors.
135. Specifically, black rage could explain the defendant's irrational fear of whites
rather than people in general, when arguing paranoia or a general psychosis.
136. To calculate the degree of insanity suffered by a black person, "one must
first total all that appears to represent illness and then subtract the Black Norm."
GRIER & COBBS, supra note 113, at 179. The remaining elements are "illness and a
proper subject for therapeutic endeavor." Id. The Black Norm is a sum of healthy
cultural paranoia, cultural depression, and cultural antisocialism. See id. at 178. This
alternate Norm is necessary for blacks to "make it" in America. See id.
137. Such a finding would lead to a lack of understanding of the defendant's
mental health by the court and the jury because the expert, who may otherwise tes-
tify about the mental health of the defendant, would be required to eliminate from
testimony any evidence that indicated black rage and that was obtained by the
expert's evaluation of the defendant. Thus, the evidence presented to the trier of fact
consider black rage as the functional equivalent of battered
woman syndrome. That is to say, battered woman syndrome and
black rage, although not exactly the same, should serve the
same function in criminal defense jurisprudence.
Black Rage as the Functional Equivalent of Battered Woman
Syndrome
Both battered woman syndrome and black rage initially mani-
fest themselves as defense mechanisms to forms of abuse. The
battered woman realizes her limited options and becomes pas-
sive in response to repeated physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse.'38 Likewise, the brutalized black person, seeing and
experiencing daily the historical and perpetual ill-treatment of
blacks and perceiving that blacks are akin to an endangered
species, develops a coping mechanism centered around
paranoia.139 Neither battered woman syndrome nor black rage
are independent forms of mental illness but are subsets of other
recognized forms of psychoses.'40
Additionally, expert testimony concerning both battered wom-
an syndrome and black rage provides a subjective view of the
life of the accused. Battered woman syndrome focuses on the
subjective life of a battered woman, as opposed to a "typical"
woman, and provides a glimpse of the defendant's thoughts and
emotions that led to the homicide."" Black rage focuses on the
subjective life of a black person living in America, as opposed to
focusing on the experiences of a hypothetical "citizen."' Testi-
for evaluation would be incomplete and any decision that was reached based upon
such evidence would be suspect.
138. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text (discussing battered woman
syndrome).
139. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text (discussing black rage).
140. Battered woman syndrome sometimes has been defined as a subset of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. See Goldman, supra note 88, at 193 n.30. Cultural para-
noia among blacks is viewed as an adaptive device, not a pathology. Black rage op-
erates as a subset of unhealthy paranoia. See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 113, at
166-79, 206.
141. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text.
142. This category of black people includes those who were not born in America,
including African and Caribbean immigrants. See Eye-to-Eye with Connie Chung,
supra note 8 (Kunstler explaining why the black rage defense applies to Colin
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mony would involve the amount of reflection that the accused
gave to racism before the homicide, as well as any personal ex-
periences that may have contributed to the move from healthy
cultural paranoia to unhealthy individual paranoia."" Admit-
ting testimony concerning black rage would allow the trier of
fact to hear information relevant to the accused's actions and
consider that information when evaluating the evidence, in the
same manner that admitting battered woman syndrome evi-
dence aids the trier of fact.1"
Furthermore, battered woman syndrome and black rage serve
to make the criminal justice system more inclusive. Various le-
gal scholars argued that the legal system, including the criminal
justice system, was designed for the writers of the laws, namely
white males. 45 Battered woman syndrome allows the reality of
women's lives to enter the legal landscape.' Similarly, ac-
knowledging black rage permits blacks to be brought onto a
more even playing field. Battered woman syndrome and black
rage thus serve the same function, to ensure that "equal justice,"
written primarily by and for one group of people, is received by
all groups of people.
Differences, however, do exist between the two forms of abuse
excuses. The most obvious difference is the theory under which
each defense is sought to be introduced. Battered woman syn-
drome usually is offered under a self-defense theory,47 while
black rage is offered to prove insanity." The two excuses also
Ferguson even though he was not born in America). The focus is on what white rac-
ism in America does to all people labelled "black7 regardless of whether or not they
actually were born in America.
143. See Goldberg, supra note 106, at 43 (citing Charles Ogletree's evaluation of
the difficulty of proving black rage when a showing of reflection on racism is re-
quired). The predominant concern of demonstrating prior reflection on racism is "the
more evidence you have of prior race discrimination, the more evidence you have of
first-degree murder" because of inferences of premeditation. See id. (discussing the
application of personal experiences as a catalyst for the murder).
144. See Saitow, supra note 17, at 347-51.
145. See, e.g. id at 336 ("[The legal arena, beginning with early common law,
manifested itself as a [white] masculine-oriented field.").
146. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the current trend is
for states to admit expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome).
147. See supra notes 49-79 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
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differ with regard to the relationship between the defendant and
the homicide victim. The battered woman kills an identifiable
victim, the abuser himself,4 9 whereas the brutalized black per-
son kills an unidentifiable victim, someone of the Caucasian
race, but not necessarily someone who has directly perpetrated
physical or mental atrocities against the accused. 50
The differences between black rage and battered woman syn-
drome appear to be great, but when viewed as providing a more
subjective approach to traditional defenses to homicide, the dif-
ferences dissipate. The more alike the two theories appear, the
more easily compared and accepted they may be. Toward this
end, battered child syndrome may prove to be a very important
link in promoting the admissibility of black rage.
Battered Child Syndrome as the Bridge Between Battered
Woman Syndrome and the Acceptance of Black Rage
Acceptance of battered child syndrome may aid in the accep-
tance of black rage. Battered child syndrome closely resembles
battered woman syndrome 5' with the only difference being the
relationship of the abuser to the abused.'52 Given these simi-
larities, it is easier for courts to expand admissibility of battered
woman syndrome to cover battered child syndrome than it is to
expand admissibility to cover black rage. Black rage differs in
the relationship of the abuser to the abused,'53 in the past ac-
tions of the now-deceased victim toward the killer,' and in
149. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which
the syndromes are similar in terms of psychological evidence, admissibility of testi-
mony, and reasons for allowing the admittance of such testimony).
152. In the case of the battered woman, a woman typically is battered by her
husband or her boyfriend. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In the case of
the battered child, the child usually is battered by one or both parents or guardians.
See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
153. In the case of a person suffering from black rage, white society, as a whole,
has abused the black defendant. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
154. Although an explosion of black rage may occur following a racial insult or
devaluation, see Goldberg, supra note 106, at 43, often, there is no prior connection
between the victim of black rage and the black defendant. See Michael Alexander,
Black Rage, NEWSDAY, May 9, 1994, at B4 (describing a black rage actor's victims as
strangers to the assailant).
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the theories used to justify the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny.'55 Acceptance of black rage would require the development
of a novel argument, while battered child syndrome would re-
quire no new analysis.'56 Nevertheless, black rage may gain
acceptance more easily if there were a wider understanding and
acceptance of battered woman syndrome and its twin, battered
child syndrome. Wider acceptance of battered woman syndrome
and battered child syndrome would allow the courts and society
to begin to approach cases with the requisite subjectivity needed
in situations involving black rage.
Battered child syndrome, however, currently engenders sub-
stantial controversy. 57 The lack of desire to expand battered
woman syndrome to cover children who kill results from a fun-
damental belief that matricide and patricide are inexcusable. 5 '
Such crimes strike at the heart of our social organization of the
family unit.'59 Additionally, sexual abuse often is involved in
parricide,5 0 and although the doctrine of self-defense includes
sexual assault as a crime warranting violent defensive ac-
tions,' 6 ' sexual abuse by parents is not an area with which
courts have come to terms. 62
155. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (describing the different theo-
ries of justification under which battered woman syndrome and black rage are
sought to be admitted).
156. To accept black rage as the equivalent of battered woman syndrome would
require the courts to do additional analysis of the insanity defense and its relation
to self-defense. To accept battered child syndrome as equivalent to battered woman
syndrome, however, is as simple as substituting the words "husband" and "Wife" in
battered woman syndrome cases for the words "parent" and "child" in battered child
syndrome cases.
157. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (chronicling the treatment of
battered child syndrome in the courts).
158. See MONES, supra note 93, at 8.
159. See id.
160. See generally Nancy Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual
Abuse as Justification, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 36 (quoting attorney/author Paul
Mones as stating that "[wiell over 90 percent of the kids who kill their parents are
physically, emotionally, or sexually abused"); see also Sacks, supra note 82, at 358
(stating that children who commit parricide in many instances "suffer 'poly-abuse,'
where they are physically, mentally, and often sexually abused").
161. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
self-defense claims).
162. See McCord, supra note 71, at 41-44 (discussing the disparate treatment by
courts of psychological testimony concerning child sexual abuse claims).
BLACK RAGE
The legal system's failure to recognize the nature and extent
of the abuse to which children are subjected mirrors the treat-
ment of the abuse underlying black rage. The psychological scar-
ring caused by racism is seen as less important than the scar-
ring of the physical body. There can be little doubt that if whites
currently conducted frequent mass public lynchings of blacks,
courts would give more credence to black rage. There is, howev-
er, a sense among many in society that racism is not a serious
problem,'63 and that, therefore, black rage has no basis."M
Those who harbor such a belief, however, are usually not racial
minorities and, as a result, may be less aware of racism.
Personal or societal feelings about racism should not govern
the courts' admittance of expert testimony. Yet ultimately, per-
sonal and societal perceptions will govern the issue. Either the
court or members of society will be the trier of fact. As such,
various legal, psychological, and societal concerns may factor
into the decision as to whether testimony concerning black rage
will be admitted. If such testimony is found admissible, these
concerns also will determine whether that testimony convinces
juries and whether black rage becomes an acceptable defense.
CONSEQUENCES OF ACCEPTANCE OF BLACK RAGE
Legal Problems
In the end, the legal system, which must determine the course
of black rage as an abuse excuse, faces a great number of prob-
lems regarding the admittance and acceptance of black rage tes-
timony. Those involved in the various aspects of operation of the
legal system are, therefore, important. Likewise, the various
stages of a criminal trial for homicide become vital.
When black rage is asserted, many difficulties arise during
jury selection. Lawyers must carefully weed out those potential
jurors harboring racial biases as well as those who are incredu-
163. See Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at A54 (stating that "many whites already find
[legitimate black anger] difficult to accept").
164. Black rage is predicated upon the idea that blacks in America are suffering
at the hands of whites. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text. Thus, if one
allegedly removes the suffering, then no basis for the theory exists.
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lous to the idea that racism is very much alive.'65 Although
some lawyers may believe that the remedy to juror selection
simply entails stacking the jury with blacks, there is reason to
believe that blacks are just as hostile to the black rage defense
as are other racial groups. 6 Although non-blacks may never
understand or believe what blacks experience in America, 6 '
blacks may be more skeptical of such a defense because they
most likely have had similar experiences yet have not been driv-
en to kill." Additionally, safeguarding against the biases of
judges also may be necessary. 69
Fear of other race-based defenses being raised is a concern of
some legal commentators.' v Such defenses likely would not
165. See State v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (requiring a
trial judge to question jurors about racial prejudice when a defense of black rage
was asserted).
166. See The CBS News poll discussed supra note 10. Sixty-eight percent of the
56 blacks polled indicated that black rage was not an acceptable defense for commit-
ting a violent crime. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 133 (arguing that acceptance of
black rage would perpetuate negative stereotypes of blacks as barely being able to
control their tempers and as being generally inferior to whites); see generally
DERSHOWfl', supra note 5, at 33 (noting that some blacks disagree with the black
rage defense because it stigmatizes them as "prone to violence and lawlessness").
167. See Goldberg, supra note 106, at 43 (citing Harvard Law School professor
Charles Ogletree, who has attempted to use the black rage defense).
168. See Alexander, supra note 154, at B4 (citing Dr. Alvin Poussaint for the
proposition that most blacks take a healthy point of view on dealing with discrimi-
nation and racism); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 90 (stating that 'the vast
majority of African Americans . . . have not used the mistreatment they have suf-
fered as an excuse to mistreat others"). It is the responsibility of the defense attor-
ney to move the jury from the general theory of black rage to the way in which the
defendant, himself, suffered from black rage. Cf Eye-to-Eye with Connie Chung, su-
pra note 8 (quoting attorney William Kunstler on the Ferguson Case: 'That's what a
lawyer's there for, to look at what available defenses are and then try to see wheth-
er any of them fit your particular case.").
It is quite obvious that not every woman suffering from battered woman syn-
drome and not every child suffering from battered child syndrome kills their abuser.
Yet, the syndromes still are admitted and accepted by some juries. See supra notes
49-108 and accompanying text. The role of the attorney in conveying the importance
of the admitted evidence is therefore a key factor in jury understanding and accep-
tance of the defense.
169. See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1974) (providing clear
evidence of the trial court judge's personal biases against blacks raising a claim of
black rage, even though the trial court judge was, himself, black). The trial judge
also expressed disbelief in the findings of a psychologist of the defendant's insanity
because the psychologist was, herself, black. See id. at 1155.
170. See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 33 (stating that "if the black
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succeed, however, as the institution of slavery and the history of
state sanctioned discrimination in this country would allow
courts to distinguish the experience of blacks in America from
that of other ethnic groups. 17' Likewise, admitting and accept-
ing black rage generally will not diminish the quality of de-
fenses. Black rage will not be asserted frequently for several
reasons. First, most crime is intraracial,72 so the black rage
issue will not be relevant in most instances.73 Second, insanity
is a rarely asserted defense. 74 Third, insanity pleas are accept-
ed with even greater infrequency than they are employed. 75
The mental health profession aids the legal system by evalu-
ating the mental condition of defendants and witnesses, and by
caring for persons found to require treatment. The acceptance of
black rage by the courts thus would have important ramifica-
tions on how the mental health community performs these
tasks.1
76
rage defense were to succeed, we would see white skinheads invoking 'white rage' in
defense of white-against-black racist killings").
171. This Note does not advance the theory that blacks alone have suffered and
continue to suffer atrocities and discrimination in this country. Rather, psychological
evidence of the impact of discrimination on blacks is more readily available and can
be a basis for disparate treatment of blacks in cases in which black rage is asserted.
172. Cf BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIM-
IZATION 1992 (1993) (stating that blacks were significantly more likely than whites
or persons of other races to be victims of crime and about 85% of black victims
were victimized by blacks).
173. Black rage, as it relates to insanity, should be restricted to cases involving a
white victim because whites are the source of fear and paranoia for the sufferer of
black rage. Therefore, because blacks mostly kill other blacks, black rage will not
apply in most instances.
174. See NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14-15 (1983) (stating that the
insanity defense is raised in less than one percent of all felony cases in the United
States); see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INSANITY
DEFENSE (1986) (stating that of the 463,000 people in prison, less than 4,000 suc-
cessfully pleaded the insanity defense).
175. See NATL MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, supra. note 174 (asserting that the insanity
defense is actually successful one-quarter of the time it is raised).
176. See ABA, supra note 41, at Standard 7-1.1.
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Ramifications of Accepting Black Rage for the Mental Health
Profession
Legal punishment of those found to have been insane usually
requires some form of confinement or out-patient treatment.
17
Confinement of a sufferer of black rage for the purpose of treat-
ment, however, poses a problem because treating black rage may
be outside the scope of mental health experts.1 ' The root cause
of black rage is white racism, a social evil whose cure is clearly
beyond the ability of mental health experts." If no treatment
exists for black rage, then courts, society, and mental health
providers must reconcile themselves to indefinite incarceration
of an individual due to a societal problem. 8 '
Indefinite incarceration is the only solution to a problem that
neither the legal system nor the psychological community can
cure.'' More important than the legal and psychological impli-
cations of accepting black rage as part of an insanity defense,
however, are the societal consequences of such acceptance.
Societal Consequences
The most obvious societal concern related to accepting black
rage as part of an insanity defense is the possible increase in the
negative view of blacks.'82 Because black rage actors harm vic-
177. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal effect of
accepting an insanity plea).
178. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 33 (asserting that "no reputable psychia-
trist would claim to be able to treat racism as a mental illness").
179. In order for mental health experts to cure the sufferer of black rage, they
would have to be able to demonstrate to black rage sufferers that white racism no
longer exists. This is a very difficult task, the achievement of which is unlikely. For
as long as blacks and whites have had contact with each other in America, white
racism has existed. It is not a problem over which mental health experts have con-
trol. See generally GRIER & COBBS, supra note 113, at 208 (describing the constant,
historical desolation of black life in America). It also is not likely that racism is a
problem that eventually will dissipate with time.
180. Cf. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 90 (arguing that acceptance of black rage
would lead racists to demand longer sentences and harshen police intrusion against
blacks).
181. See id.
182. See Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at A54 (raising the concern that black rage
will perpetuate notions that blacks are capable of exploding with rage at any mo-
ment and that blacks are "deficient" overall, as compared to whites).
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tims that are not.identifiable as having personally harmed the
black actor before the fatal incident, an increase in fear of blacks
and an increase in animosity toward blacks undoubtedly will
arise in non-black segments of society. As a result of increased
skepticism in non-black communities, the vast majority of
blacks, who are not consumed by black rage but who may have
developed a healthy cultural paranoia,'83  may experience
greater difficulty in proving that they can handle everyday pres-
sures without becoming violently insane."
Black rage's acceptance also may affect law enforcement offi-
cers. When policing predominantly black neighborhoods, police
officers, especially white officers, may be more fearful and quick
to judge the actions of blacks based on a misperception of blacks
as being inherently more violent than others." Such misun-
derstanding undoubtedly will begin a vicious cycle of blacks
being judged based on their race, stopped, harassed, and made
to feel the full effect of white racism. Such actions and attitudes
are often underlying causes of black rage and thus would feed
into the perpetuation of black rage.
Acceptance of black rage may produce a final serious conse-
quence: a further diminishing of Americans' faith in the criminal
justice system.'86 Though many already question Americans'
faith in the administration of justice, and cynics would say that
such concerns are a moot point because further reduction in
faith in the system is nearly impossible because faith in the sys-
tem is already very low, the concern remains legitimate. Justice
systems function only as long as people allow them to function.
Having confidence and faith in the criminal justice system is
essential to the continued functioning of the system. Thus, a
183. See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 113, at 178 (defining "cultural paranoia" as
a survival technique for blacks).
184. See DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 5, at 32-33.
185. See id. at 90 (discussing the possibility and repercussions of "preventive in-
tervention in black neighborhoods" by police).
186. The basis for the loss of faith would be a general sense that the system no
longer holds individuals responsible and therefore, gives people the license to kill
and commit other offenses. See Thomas Fahie, Black Rage Is No Defense, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 27, 1994, at A34 (stating strongly that "If we're going to allow civilization to
be attacked and destroyed by cockamamie justifications like Kunstler's, then this
country won't be a fit place to live in anymore").
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lack of belief that the criminal justice system can punish wrong-
doers fairly is not in the best interest of maintaining our current
system, assuming that people believe that the system is worth
maintaining.
CONCLUSION
The viability of black rage as a defense to the homicide of
white victims by black defendants remains uncertain. Permitting
expert testimony regarding black rage and its relation to insani-
ty would not alter the course of criminal jurisprudence signifi-
cantly. Rather, admitting expert testimony regarding black rage
would serve to provide a more complete picture of the accused's
circumstances for the trier of fact. Battered woman syndrome
and battered child syndrome acknowledge the fact that physical
and sexual abuse leave psychological scars on the victim. Black
rage similarly can illustrate how emotional, economic, and psy-
chological abuse by a racist society leave psychological scars on
the black victim. Regardless of whether courts believe that black
rage is a catalyst for insanity. 7 or whether courts view black
rage as another abuse excuse, 188 similar to battered woman
syndrome, expert testimony regarding black rage should be
admitted by the court in order to assist the trier of fact.
The trier of fact will have the most difficult task of assessing
black rage. The trier of fact must carefully evaluate complex
psychological testimony while balancing legal and societal inter-
ests.'89 A complete balance ultimately should lead the trier of
fact to a verdict of NGRI. NGRI allows criminal commitment
without finding the defendant was legally capable of knowing
and appreciating his actions. 90 Verdicts pronouncing legal in-
sanity however, generally are not favored in society.'9 '
187. See Adcock, supra note 111, at 7.
188. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 89-91.
189. See RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRm-
CAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 129 (1988) (finding
in a study that juries faced with an insanity defense put experts' clinical/medical
testimony into a moral-legal context).
190. See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 24, at 20-21.
191. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 173, at
2 (noting that "the view of some of the public [is] that the insanity defense is a
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Law and society are irrevocably intertwined and functionally
interdependent. Society legitimately fears letting murderers
roam free. Likewise, the judicial system has a legitimate interest
in punishing wrongdoers and deterring potential wrongdoers.
These interests, however, should never be furthered at the ex-
pense of those who cannot form the requisite intent to commit
the crime charged. To allow unjust punishment and incarcera-
tion because of societal fears or because of the inability to under-
stand and cure the racism that triggers black rage would pro-
duce more harm to America's judicial system than the so-called
"abuse excuses" themselves. In the final analysis of black rage,
courts are left in the undesirable position of deciding to what
extent and by which device the criminal justice system will be
harmed: by expanding current abuse excuses to include black
rage and alienating society or by denying a black rage sufferer
an opportunity to enter evidence of black rage, thereby under-
mining the mens rea element in criminal jurisprudence.
Tosha Yvette Foster
piece of legal chicanery").
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